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Abstract
This paper analyses Uganda’s external debt problem. Like many other countries in the
sub-Saharan Africa, Uganda is a severely indebted low-income country. Uganda’s total
debt stock at end June 1993 was estimated at US$2.64 billion, with a debt service ratio of
nearly 80%. A look at Uganda’s debt profile since the 1970s reveals a composition of
debt mainly from multilateral creditors. The study particularly links debt to economic
growth.  A major observation is the acute debt servicing obligation of the country, and
the fact that a large proportion of Uganda’s debt is not eligible for rescheduling. Debt
payments have been a fundamental cause of low economic growth.  Of great concern is
whether the economy can sustain its current growth rate of 5% per annum and at the
same time maintain adequate domestic investment, given the heavy reliance on foreign
import capital flows. Debt relief is not enough; continued government commitment to
structural reforms and sound debt management are essential. The need to continue the
ongoing restructuring of the economy and promote further growth is apparent. But how
sustainable and possible is this challenging path without accumulating more debt?
GROWTH AND FOREIFN DEBT: THE UGANDAN EXPERIENCE 1
I. Introduction
During the lost decade of the 1980s, the external debt facing the sub Sahara African
countries received increasing attention.  The immediate causes of the region’s debt crisis
in the 1980s were the economic slowdown and the sharp increases in international interest
rates resulting from monetary contractions in some OECD countries and the fiscal policies
that were pursued by the USA.  The roots of these difficulties lay in the oil price shocks,
however, and the resulting unprecedented increase in international lending to developing
countries in the 1970s.  The debt crisis of the 1980s was almost the mirror image of the
previous decade.  The failure of many SSA countries to adapt to the changed external
environment — especially their domestic policies — tended to aggravate the debt servcing
problem .
Many countries responded with structural adjustment programmes supported by the
World Bank and the IMF that were aimed at inducing growth, restoring price stability
and reducing external imbalances.  Despite attempts by donors to avail debt relief and
the continued provision of external assistance, the situation continued to deteriorate and
by the turn of the 1990s the position of most of the countries in Africa had become
precarious.  As a result, most of these countries now look back at almost a decade of lost
growth. Uganda is no exception.  It is against this background of economic adjustment
that Uganda’s debt service payment problems are analysed.
In the Ugandan case the decline in the foreign exchange earning capacity of the
economy was aggravated by the decline of international coffee prices and hence receipts.
This adversely affected Uganda’s ability to service its debt and led to the rapid
accumulation of arrears.  The urgent need to rehabilitate the war-torn economy amid
declining export receipts forced the government to resort to external financing, which
led to a sharp rise in the stock of debt in 1987.  By June 1993, the stock of debt outstanding
and disbursed stood at US$2.64 billion with arrears of US$253 million  This stock of
arrears, which had been reduced from the June 1982 level of US$586.3 million, had
caused legal action against the government from some quaters and greatly jeopardized
the government’s ability to manage its foreign reserves effectively.  Going by indicators,
the debt outstanding and disbursed is estimated at 105% of GDP, with a debt service
ratio of nearly 80% which constitutes a major bottleneck to Uganda’s economic recovery
process and future developments.
There is need to rehabilitate the economy into a growth path once agian and it is on
these  grounds that the government has developed an external debt strategy that involves
prudent debt management.
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II.  Objectives of the study
The major aim of this tudy is to provide an analysis of the debt faced by  Uganda, and its
implications for sustainable economic growth. This paper therefore has the following
objectives:
• To examine the magnitude of Uganda’s debt, including the structure, source, type
and composition of external debt.
• To assess emperically the internal and external factors influencing external debt
accumulation.
• To analyse the debt servicing capacity and sustainability of debt; the Cohen model is
used for debt sustainabliity analysis.
• To draw policy implications for macroeconomic management.
III.  Dimensions of the external debt problem
By the end of 1992 Uganda’s total external debt was US$2.6 billion. Over 60% was
outstanding to multilaterals, and the debt service to multilaterals alone in 1991/92 was
31%.  Arrears stood at US$2253 million (117%  of projected foreign exchange earnings).
The debt services ratio did not fall below 34% in the next five years.
Given this situation, it is likely that Uganda will find it difficult to service even its
multilateral debt in the future without a substantial reduction in the debt service obligations
that it has to find from its own resources. It is in light of this that the Uganda government
has developed an external debt strategy with the aim of restructing the country’s debt.
The hope is that creditors and donors will adopt a flexible stance in recognition of Uganda’s
exceptional circumstances.
The decade of the 1970s witnessed an average growth in the stock of debt of 18.5%;
in the 1980s an average growth of 13.4% was recorded.  The terms of trade (TOT) over
the same period averaged 176.11 and 107.56 respectively (1987 = 100), which also resulted
in dwindling export receipts.  Export growth recorded a negative rate because of the
decline of commodity prices in the world market.  The arrears (part of debt stock) position
grew from US$30 million in 1987 to US$5,858.5 million, largely because the persistently
low level of foreign exchange inflows could not sustain the high debt service ratio.
Since the External Loans Act (1962) gave powers only to the Minister of Finance to
contract loans, all loans contracted for the public sector were government guaranteed.
The exchange control act, until 1990, did not allow any other agent except the central
bank (Bank of Uganda) to transact external financial transactions.  This meant that all
external loans had a foreign currency guarantee by the Bank of Uganda.  The non-
guaranteed debt was contracted by the government on behalf of the private sector and is
very small in magnitude.  By the end of June 1992 the stock of debt to the private sector
was estimated at US$51.95 million, which is only 1.96 % of the debt outstanding and
disbursed.  This rose to US$75 million, by the end of June 1993.
Magnitude of the debt
Table 1 shows the size of Uganda’s external indebtedness in both current dollar and
constant dollar values for the period 1970 to 1990.  The growth of Uganda’s external
debt fell sharply in 1973. This was mainly due to the donor community’s economic and
financial retaliation after the declaration of the economic war in 1972, which led to the
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expulsion from Uganda of the Asian community (backbone of the trade and commerce
sector at the time).  That resulted in both a slowing down of disbursements and a freezing
of commitments to Uganda. The steep rise of nominal debt by 22.1% in 1974 reflects a
single disbursement from a multilateral creditor.  The external debt in constant dollars
fell between 1973 and 1975.
Table 1:  Uganda’s external debt US$ millions 1970—1990
Year Total external Growth Total EDT Growth in EDT
 debt in EDT (constant (constant dollars)
(EDT) % dollars) %
1970 138.4 443.6
1971 160.7 16.1 448.5 10.1
1972 183.1 13.9 515.8 5.6
1973 189.0 3.2 432.2 -16.2
1974 230.8 22.1 377.8 -12.6
1975 240.3 4.1 357.5 -5.4
1976 278.1 15.7 408.9 14.4
1977 354.1 27.3 479.1 17.2
1978 426.0 20.3 524.8 9.5
1979 574.2 34.8 591.0 12.6
1980 732.7 27.6 621.3 5.1
1981 793.9 8.4 687.3 10.6
1982 933.4 17.6 851.3 23.9
1983 1016.1 8.9 973.2 14.3
1984 1031.1 1.5 1012.7 4.1
1985 1171.3 13.6 1171.3 15.7
1986 1286.6 9.8 1244.3 6.2
1987 1659.0 28.9 1456.4 17.1
1988 1799.0 8.4 1502.9 3.2
1989 1809.0 0.6 493.8 -0.6
1990 2200.0 21.6 1656.6 10.9
Source: World Bank (1996): World Debt Tables 1992.
The external debt constant dollar value is computed by deflating the nominal external debt value by the
World Unit Import Value Index.
Most of the external financing that came from multilaterals during the 1970s was
from the African Development Bank and the East African Development Bank.  There
was steady growth in nominal debt between 1975 and 1979.  This was mainly debt from
bilateral sources dominated by Arab creditors, who had a major influence on both political
and economic trends in the country during that time.  Between 1979 and 1987, a number
of developments affected Uganda’s level of indebtedness.  The civilian regime that came
into power in 1979 was quick to take advantage of re-established ties with the donor
community..  The sharp declines of nominal debt (similar pattern of growth rate in constant
terms) in 1984 and 1986 reflect the political and economic instability.  In 1984 the
stabilization programme adopted in 1981 was abandoned in the midst of intense civil
strife, and 1986 saw the coming to power of the current National Resistance Movement
(NRM) government and the launching of the economic recovery programme.  The
government has had to resort to external borrowing (albeit on concessionary terms) to
implement this programme and this has resulted in the rise in debt since 1987.
Debt profile
The financing of the debt contracted was largely through official sources at both
multilateral and bilateral level (see Table 2).  Between 1970 and 1980, the loans from
multilateral institutions accounted for about 57.7% of the debt contracted, while the
Paris Club share amounted to 4.9%, non Paris Club and commercial creditors’ contribution
was at 27.6% and 9.8%, respectively.
Table 2: Outstanding debt by category (percentage of total)
1970—1980 1981—1990
Multilaterals 57.1 67.6
Paris Club bilaterals  4.9  9.5
Non-Paris Club bilaterals 27.6 14.7
Commercial  9.8  8.2
Source:  Bank of Uganda
Table 3:  Uganda’s total external debt, Publicly guaranteed long-and medium-term and
short-term debt, 1980-1990 (US$ million)
Year        Total external debt     Long-term debt
                                                 Publicly guaranteed     Non-guaranteed
Amount Share(%)   Amount Share(%)
1980 732.7 578.0 78.9 9.7 1.3
1981 783.9 543.0 68.4 7.7 1.0
1982 933.4 593.0 63.5 7.3 0.8
1983 1016.1 615.0 60.5 5.7 0.6
1984 1031.1 652.0 63.2 6.0 0.6
1985 1171.3 822.0 70.2 6.9 0.6
1986 12.866 966.0 75.1 8.0 0.6
1987 1659.0 1320.0 79.6 9.6 0.6
1988 1799.0 1455.0 80.9 9.1 0.5
1989 1809.0 1488.0 82.3
1990 2200.0
Source: World Bank (1990, p.579)
In the 1980s, the share contributed by the multilaterals increased to 67.6% and that of
Paris Club creditors rose to 9.5%. The shares of non Paris Club and commercial creditors
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declined to 14.7% and 8.2%, respectively .  The changes in the percentage contribution
by the different groups of creditors is explained by the current debt contraction portfolio,
which reveals a preference for highly concessionary loans from the multilateral and Paris
Club group of creditors.  As a result of the governments’ prudent debt management
policy and the build up of arrears to non Paris Club and commercial creditors, less
contraction of loans from the latter category is taking place.
External debt can further be broken down into public and publicly guaranteed,
private non-guaranteed, and short-term debt.  As can be seen from Table 3, public and
publicly guaranteed debt forms over 60% of total external debt.  Short-term debt has
generally been at low levels – below 10%.
Uganda’s debt-export ratio was significantly high at over 1000% between 1990
and 1993 due to poor terms of trade and fall in coffee prices  (Table 4); consequently the
debt service ratio was also high over most of this period at over 60%. This heavy debt
burden further strains the weak balance of payments position and Uganda’s quest for
external viability.  According to Sharer et al. (1995), given Uganda’s initial weak external
situation, its frequent inability to meet all contractual debt service obligations and the
lack of access to commercial financing beyond normal trade credits, the traditional
criterion of spontaneous access to commercial borrowing as an indicator of external
viability is not relevant.  Under these circumstances, one can best assess Uganda’s
movement towards external viability in terms of the extent to which debt service ratios
and reliance on exceptional donor financing can be reduced.
We argue in this paper that the composition and profile of Uganda’s debt outstanding
and disbursed (DOD) and debt service obligations reveal an increasingly difficult external
financial position largely due to the following reasons:
Table 4: Debt burden indicators for Uganda (%)
1980 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Ratio of external debt
to expors of goods
and services (%) 212.3 4791 610.0 744.8 1,084.6 1,436.5 1,549.3
Ratio of external debt
to GCP (%) 55.7 31.4 30.7 43.6 63.3 87.9 109.6
Ratio of debt service
to export of goods
and services 17.3 39.9 62.7 61.8 60.7 75.5 59.6
Source:  World Bank, (1996).
• The persistent low levels of foreign exchange inflows cannot sustain the high debt
service ratio.
• The preponderance of multilateral debt limits the benefits Uganda could obtain through
traditional rescheduling.
• A large proportion of debt owed to the Paris Club group of creditors was contracted
after the cut-off date (1 July 1981) and is therefore not eligible for rescheduling.
• Little precedence existed for rescheduling debt owed to non OECD bilateral creditors,
who account for the largest portion of non-multilateral DOD.
• Of the uninsured commercial debt, 26.78% cannot be rescheduled on favourable
terms as a number of loans were owed to contractors with work in progress or were
secured on specific terms.
Perhaps the most significant underlying factor in Uganda’s debt crisis has been poor
debt management.
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IV. Debt management
Debt management involves the deliberate and planned acquisition, deployment and
retirement of loans for the purpose of promoting economic growth and development.
This entails articulation and formulation of policy for external borrowing, control and
surveillance of external borrowing, and keeping comprehensive and accurate data on
external borrowing.  These crucial aspects of debt management have not been well
undertaken in Uganda’s case.
Prior to 1982, very little information existed on external debt and there was no basic
institution in place to effectively manage debt through efficient data collection, assess
the sustainability of debt and offer advice on existing international resources. The Treasury
Department in the Ministry of Finance and the Public Debt Section, Accounts Department,
in the Bank of Uganda, handled both internal and external debt, and the composition,
stock and payment schedule was not clearly known.
The responsibilities for aid coordination and debt management were shared in varying
degrees by the Aid Coordination Unit in the Ministry of Finance, the Commissioner/
Treasury Officer of Accounts; the External Debt Management Office (EDMO) and the
Foreign Exchange Operations in the Bank of Uganda; the Aid Coordination Unit in the
Prime Minister’s Office; and the Aid Coordination Unit in the former Ministry of
Economic Planning.  The exact role of each institution was not clearly defined or backed
by full legislative authority.  This led to a weakened flow of information among the
concerned units, which in turn resulted in poor coordination and record keeping, and
inefficient verification and monitoring of debt.  The External Loan Act of 1962 and the
Loans (Guarantee) Act of 1958 jointly vest legal authority for the contraction and
management of external debt with the Minister of Finance (MOF). The Ministry of Finance
divided its management role between the Aid Coordination Unit in the MOF, which
assists in the negotiations of new loans and facilitates the flow of aid-related funds into
the country.  The Treasury, as stipulated by the Loans Act, authorizes all disbursement
requests and all debt service payments; it therefore has comparative advantage in
maintaining up-to-date external debt related information. Despite this comparative
advantage, the Treasury is institutionally weak and does not have adequate capacity to
perform this debt reporting function.  As a result, the External Debt Management Office
(EDMO) in the Bank of Uganda has taken over this responsibility. Dependence on EDMO
has been further increased by the capacity constraints within the Ministry of Finance’s
Aid Coordination Unit and its apparent inability to take charge of the country’s aid
portfolio, as authorized by the law.
As a result of insufficient information and poor coordination, the government has not
been able to ensure that all new debt is contracted on terms compatible with the country’s
external debt burden and its ability to service and repay this debt in the future. Effective
in the mid 1980s, the government succeeded in ensuring that the implementing ministries
do not sign loans independent of the Ministry of Finance, although in some instances the
implementing ministries have conducted negotiations with lenders and suppliers without
earlier involvement of the ministry or the central bank.  This has led to acceptance of
financial commitments on unfavourable terms.
There was also no clearly articulated policy defining the order of priority in which
creditors should be paid, although maturities falling due to the IMF and World Bank
group were always serviced on time.  As a result, creditors who persistently pressured
but who had not necessarily provided the maximum future benefits to Uganda were
sometimes paid in preference to other creditors.  On some occasions, Bank of Uganda
has had to resort to borrowing under short-term commercial facilities to make payments
to key multilateral creditors.
Given the lack of coordination it became almost impossible to keep accurate records
of the volume and structure of Uganda’s external debt and to devise the time profile of
the debt projections.  Poor debt management created a problem of debt servicing for the
country.
Owing to these weaknesses, government in 1991 conducted an extensive debt
management exercise within the Bank of Uganda and as a result the total national stock
of debt has been derived, verified with the creditors and recorded centrally; the debt
records have been computerized, and staff involved in debt management are being trained
in the principles of debt management and the use of computer software related to debt.
Effective July 1992, government centralized all functions of various units by creating
a Central Debt Unit in the Ministry of Finance, although EDMO in the Bank of Uganda
still has the duty of keeping all records pertaining to monitoring of disbursements,
maturities and other data related to debt.  This move has improved the control and the
coordination of policy, eliminated duplication of effort, and ensured efficient transfer of
information.
10 RESEARCH PAPER 66
V.  External debt strategy
Given Uganda’s debt crisis, government decided to immediately develop and is currently
implementing an external debt strategy in order to try to resolve the country’s debt problem.
The aims of the debt strategy include the following:
• Clearing the bulk of the accumulated arrears, which were causing legal actions against
government and threats to seize assets to satisfy claims.  This has resulted in an
embargo on disbursements and hence project disruptions.
• Stopping increase in the accumulation of penalty and late interest charges.
• Reducing contractual debt service due to a level commensurate with Uganda’s ability
to pay.
The components of the strategy include rescheduling, debt buy back and restructuring
of uninsured commercial debt, implementation of the fifth and sixth dimensions facilities,
and possible cancellations.  Our major focus will be on debt rescheduling, which forms
an integral part of the debt strategy.
Paris Club reschedulings
Uganda has benefited from a number of debt cancellations granted by the Paris Club
creditors, in addition to the reductions obtained under the 1989 rescheduling on Toronto
terms and the 1992 rescheduling on enhanced Toronto terms.  These include cancellations
from France, Germany, UK and USA on loans originally provided on concessionary
terms.
As at end June 1992, approximately US$279 million was outstanding to the Paris
Club creditors, of which US$81 million represented arrears and penalty interest, and
US$26 million was principal and interest falling due in 1991/92.  The Paris Club does
not reschedule or reduce any debt that has been contracted after a particular date, which
in the case of Uganda was set at 1 July 1981 (the cut-off date).  Of the total amount
outstanding to the Paris Club, 42% (US$118 million) was contracted before the cut-off
date.  Consequently, only about US$50 million in arrears and pre cut off-date current
maturities was eligible for rescheduling in the June 1992 agreement reached with the
Paris Club.
Uganda was permitted to reschedule all arrears of principal, interest and penalty interest
coming due by end November 1993.  This was exceptional in that the Paris Club usually
grants rescheduling of maturities due during the current IMF programmes only (which
for the case of Uganda was due to expire on 30 November 1992).  The concession enabled
Uganda to budget for the fiscal year 1992/93 on the basis of this agreement.  The amount
rescheduled totalled nearly US$36 million in arrears and US$14 million in current
maturities.  The impact of this has been to reduce the debt service in this category to only
US$2 million in amount due and moratorium interest.  Under the enhanced Toronto
terms granted to least developing countries, penalty interest is not usually permitted to
be rescheduled but this was conceded for Uganda.
Debt incurred after 1 July 1993
Since half of the debt owed to Paris Club creditors was contracted after the cut-off date,
a conventional rescheduling of pre cut-off date debt would have a limited impact on the
country’s debt burden.  Uganda will therefore have to seek annually the maximum deferral
of debt ineligible for the usual Paris Club rescheduling. The arrears on the post cut-off
date debt amounted to approximately US$34 million; the Paris Club initially insisted
that this be paid in full by November 1992, which was the guaranteed consolidation
period, but ultimately conceded that Uganda’s domestic and foreign exchange budget
would not permit this and agreed with the IMF that half could be paid by November
1992.
These deferrals are associated with stringent terms — no grace periods, short repayment
periods, and no reduction of principal and interest.  The debt service that falls due is not
deferred and arrears once deferred are not eligible for any future deferrals. This serves to
intensify the debt overhang that the country is already experiencing, as it will not be
possible to re-defer these payments. It was also agreed that maturities up to 30 November
be restructured under this agreement.  The year-by-year rescheduling approach adopted
by creditors under these terms will require Uganda to return to the Paris Club on a regular
basis for the foreseeable future.
Table 5: Uganda, Paris Club history
Amount Maturity Grace Length
consolidated (years) (years) (months)
November 1981 63  9 4.5 12
December 1983    16   9 4.5   12
June 1989   105  14 6.0   12
January 1989    86                    Toronto terms: 1/3 write off
June 1992    50             Enhanced Toronto: 1/2 write off
Source: Bank of Uganda
Uganda benefited from the “Toronto terms” plan, which offered a menu of alternatives
to choose from when the consolidated amount of US$86 million was rescheduled in
January 1989 (See Table 5). One-third of the eligible maturities was forgiven, while the
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maturity of the remaining debt was extended to 14 years with an eight-year grace period.
These terms have only partially addressed the problem, however, because(1) the entire
debt was never rescheduled in this single meeting and (2) the burden of debt is postponed
only to intensify the overhang. In June 1992, the enhanced Toronto terms saw a write off
of debt worth 50% in terms of net present value. It included the exceptional element of
rescheduling maturities outside the then running IMF programme, rescheduling of penalty
interest and 50% of the post cut-off arrears.
Non OECD bilateral creditors
Uganda’s non-Paris Club creditors are owed a significant amount of arrears and penalty
charges, totalling US$185.49 million as at end June 1992 with the 1992/93 maturities
totalling US$47.31 million.  Government in the course of the financial year 1992/93
entered agreements with some of these creditors that saw the rescheduling of US$17.6
million of arrears in the financial year 1992/93.
This resulted mainly from the acceleration of maturities totalling nearly US$17.6
million, while arrears amounting to US$60 million were rescheduled.  There was also a
downward adjustment to the stock of arrears, totalling US$14.68 million.  The impact of
these measures was to reduce the stock of debt outstanding and disbursed (including
arrears) as at end of June 1993. In the meantime, all other creditors have been asked to
reschedule their stock of arrears and maintain the concessional or semi-concessional
interest rates that they apply to the underlying loans for rescheduling.
It should be noted that there are few precedents for rescheduling with some of these
creditors but it is proposed that the most favourable terms possible be requested from
them.
Buy back and restructuring of uninsured commercial
debt
A total of US$242 million of debt was outstanding to uninsured commercial creditors at
30 June 1992, of which US$226 million represented obligations to non-bank commercial
companies mostly suppliers and creditors.  Supervised under the debt reduction, a plan
concluded on 26 February 1993 saw Uganda buy back US$151.89 million of eligible
debt of its US$2.6 billion DOD at 12 cents to the dollar. This represented 6% of the total
DOD, one third of the total arrears and three-quarters of the commercial debt.  The
impact of this was a debt forgiveness amounting to US$133 million using a grant provided
by the IDA (under the debt reduction facility) totalling US$10 million by Switzerland
(US$0.7 million), Netherlands (US$2.68 million) and Germany (US$4.62 million).  This
deal provides some relief for government to come up with longer-term debt restructuring
strategies.  It is worth noting that Uganda became the fourth country to benefit from this
facility after Niger, Mozambique and Guyana.
The amount to be converted into equity, approximately US$13.1 million, mainly
includes arrears to the private sector joint venture partners.  The government is currently
in discussion with these creditors to swap these arrears for government assets in accordance
with the privatization programme.  East African Holdings and Shell are two cases in
point with which government has already concluded debt-equity swap agreements.
Given the relatively small stock of debt owed to commercial creditors, the London
Club has not featured much in the restructuring of the Ugandan debt. The availability of
the IDA debt restructuring facility and the OECD bilateral grants made the buy-back
operation more significant with regard to commercial debt.
Multilateral debt service
Government aims at soliciting bilateral donor assistance for servicing multilateral debt.
Under the ongoing fifth dimension facility, Norway and Sweden have provided the
government with resources equivalent to IBRD repayments and the government has
requested these donors to extend similar facilities for ADB maturities.  The response to
this has been positive because ADB maturities estimated at nearly US$3.57 million of
arrears and US$1 million owed to IDB were rescheduled.  Government successfully
negotiated with EADB on restructuring amounts owed to it and to date arrears guaranteed
by government at 30 June 1993, are estimated at US$15.263 million, down from US$48.1
million a year earlier.  Government committed itself to a payment of nearly US$6.8
million every financial year in order to clear this arrears over the next two and half years
and has divested itself of US$33 million arrears owed to EADB; this is now to be paid by
the private sector, which benefited from these loans.  Other creditors in this category of
divestiture include Commonwealth Development Corporation, Commonwealth Technical
Corporation, EXIM (India) and IFC; together they amount to US$51 million of arrears.
During financial year 1992/93, US$385 million of arrears was settled, of which
exceptional financing accounted for US$335 million (rescheduling alone contributing
US$141.32 million) and direct cash payment US$50 million.
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VI.  Impact of debt strategy
Much as the strategy has assumed the maximum feasible rescheduling and accepts the
accumulation of arrears to certain creditors, the minimum debt service requirement remains
high, over 60% of projected foreign exchange earnings.  There is still a high financing
gap as shown in Table 6.  The success of the debt strategy therefore depends on limiting
the extent to which the gap identified is financed through the accumulation of arrears.
The financing gap has widened especially because foreign exchange earnings have fallen
well below projected levels. Nonetheless, we hasten to mention the likely positive impacts
of the debt strategy, mainly the reduction of arrears through rescheduling.  Arrears could
be reduced from the level of US$585 million in June 1992 to US$76 million.  This takes
into account the debt buy-back operation that was successfully executed in February
1993 and also assumes that all rescheduling, restructuring and cancellation in the various
categories of debt are achieved in a timely manner.  It is also estimated that the arrears
build up would be US$650 million US$ 675 million at end 1992/93 fiscal year and over
US$1 billion by end 1995 if the strategy were not implemented.
The impact of  the debt strategy was largely realized during fiscal year 1992/93,
which saw US$385 million of arrears restructured, of which exceptional financing
accounted for US$335 million (rescheduling alone contributed US$141.32 million) and
direct cash payment US$50 million. The consequence of this was to reduce the stock of
arrears by over 50% from the end June 1992 level of US$585.3 million to only US$253.7
million a year later.
The rescheduled maturities in this financial year are estimated at US$45.74 million,
while the impact of the debt strategy on maturities falling due in 1994 — 2000 is a
reduction of interest and amortization amounting to US$105.42 million (see Table 7).
Using the growth cum debt model described below, the impact of rescheduling on growth
and debt indicators is shown in Table 8.
Although the impact of rescheduling is marginal, there is a saving on resource transfer
amounting to an annual average of 0.06% of GDP, a reduction of the potential debt-GDP
ratio by 2.5 percentage points and an increase in economic growth by 0.01% on a yearly
basis.
However, the impact of arrears cancellations totalling nearly US$) million during the
financial year 1992/93 had the fairly substantial effect of raising the growth rate of GDP
by 0.79 percentage points, lowering the debt-GDP ratio by 6.98 percentage points and
realizing a savings on resource transfer of 8.5% of GDP in calendar year 1993.
Table 6:  Uganda's external financing requirments 1989/90—1993/94 (US$ millions)
1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94
Requirements 867  772   724 898 626
Imports (goods) 584  550   441 572 122
Services (net)  56 85 82 106 170
Scheduled debt service 197  185   249 1786  80
Amortization  77   86   125 74  80
Interest, net  77   62 90 84  10
IMF repurchases  43   37 34 18  19
Settlement of arrears  19  -65 -141 30  15
Reserve build up  11   11 35 15   0
Other items net 0 6 58 -1 377
Own resources 337 260  286 325 262
Export (goods) 210 177  173 196 168
o/w coffee 159 126  119 127 116
Private transfers   78   80  111 114  -1
Other items, net   49 3 2 5 575
Financing gap 530 512  438 583
Foreign financing
Existing commitments 530 512  438 466 375
IMF purchases   42   89   89 0   0
Project aid 249 236  236 236 240
Import support 196 186  186 180 135
Debt rescheduling   43 1 1 50   -
Disbursement from new sources 0 0 0 91 158
Individual financing gap 0 0 0 26  42
Source: Bank of Uganda
Uganda’s economic reform is highly dependent on external financing. Given the
collapse of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in July 1989 and the accompanying
fall in coffee prices, which greatly affected the foreign exchange earning capacity of the
economy, attempts to increase non-coffee export may take time to increase exports earning
sufficiently to cover the fall in coffee prices.  At the same time, the economy needs a
minimum level of imports to meet its growth and stabilization targets and this calls for
considerable donor assistance, together with the economic and structural reforms currently
being implemented by government.  Even though non-coffee export earnings are picking
up, given the extremely small base of these exports, their impact on financing requirements
has so far been minimal and a significant quantitative impact on the balance of payments
can only be achieved over the medium term.  It may thus be the case that Uganda will
continue to depend heavily on donor support for some time to come, requiring substantial
disbursements from the donor community to cover the loss of coffee export earnings.
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Table 7:  Impact of debt restructuring on maturities falling due, (1994— 2000 (US$
millions)
Before restructuring
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
Creditor
Multilateral 72.02 85.05 102.15 120.05 117.99 110.99 96.95 705.16
Bilateral
Paris Club
   Pre cut-off 17.39 16.81 16.24 18.01 22.93 21.89 22.63 135.90
   Post cut-off 13.14 8.36 5.97 5.26 8.13 7.88 8.49  57.23
 Non-Paris 26.5  39.89   41.11  39.95  46.66  40.06  37.23 271.40
Commercial
non-bank 5.99 3.04 2.78 2.93 3.08 3.01 20.83
Other loan
loan category 8.323 11.15 6.82 3.6 2.94 2.73 2.42 37.89
Grand total 143.27 164.3 175.07 189.8 201.69 186.56 1228.41
After restructuring
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
Creditor
Multilateral 73.32 84.58 99.71 109.54 102.96 94.82 82.16 647.07
Bilateral
Paris Club
   Pre cut-off 17.15 16.49 15.83 17.61 22.72 21.47 20.23 131.50
   Post cut-off 9.08 8.44 5.98 5.3 8.29 8.03   8.3 53.42
Non-Paris  22.69  35.07  31.81  32.61   31.2  30.52  27.95  211.85
Commercial
non-bank 13.74 12.84 12.34 12.79 12.46 12.1 2.47 78.74
Other loan
loan category 0.131 0.122 0.113 0.053 - - - 0.42
Grand total 136.09 157.54 165.783 177.90 177.63 166.94 141.11 1123.00
Reduction in
debt service 7.18 6.76 9.29 11.90 24.06 19.62 26.61
Source: EDMO Department, Bank of Uganda (September, 1993).
Table 8: Impact of rescheduling on maturities falling due 1994—2000
Variables Before rescheduling After rescheduling
(annual average) (annual average)
Growth rate 5.73 5.74
Debt-GDP ratio 114.02 112.47
Resource transfer
(as percentage of GDP) 0.16 0.22
In addition to the increase in the level of external assistance, there has been a change
in the pattern of aid allocation.  Much of the 1980s saw project related aid accounting for
over 80% of gross disbursements; this has declined in the 1990s to less than 60% as
donors increasingly assist the government through import support aid, which not only
provides much needed balance of payments support but also counterpart funding for the
budget.
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VII.  Causes of Uganda’s debt crisis
The growing problem of debt accumulation in sub-Saharan Africa has received
considerable attention in the literature and is now recognized as a serious global economic
issue. Greene (1989) attributes this debt problem to both domestic policies and external
factors. Besides expansionary fiscal policies and borrowing against exports to maintain
consumption levels, many of these countries pursued other policies that weakened their
external positions — maintenance of high levels of imports, over - valued exchange
rates, government subsidy policies and external financing of over — ambitious
development projects.  From the late 1970s the shift in terms of trade against African
countries and the decline in export earnings has been a major external influence and has
greatly hampered the countries' ability to meet their debt obligations.  Another factor
that contributed to sub-Saharan debt burdens was the decline in net capital inflows.  The
rise in foreign interest rates, although less important because of the predominantly official
character of sub-Saharan debt, may have affected a number of countries that made
significant use of commercial borrowing.
The international economic environment has an important impact on SSA economies.
It drives the prices of African exports, the demand for those exports and the effective
interest rates countries pay.  The terms of trade of developing countries are also indirectly
affected by economic trends in industrialized countries.
A major external factor in Uganda’s debt crisis is the dramatic decline in export receipts
due to declining coffee prices and unfavourable terms of trade. The price of coffee (the
major export) decresed steadily from 1985 to 1993 and Uganda suffered annual declines
in its terms of trade every year from 1986 to 1992. The decline in the terms of trade
resulted in a sharp increase in Uganda’s debt service to exports ratio, which was over
60% between 1988 and 1993.
A major cause of debt has been the high level of donor financed development
expenditures.  The reliance of the adjustment effort adopted in 1987 on external financing
has created a larger debt burden for Uganda, with the external debt more than doubling
during the adjustment period from  US$1,659 million to $2.9 billion as of June 1994.
Most of this increase was attributable to credits obtained from multilateral institutions to
support the balance of payments and finance development projects. Multilateral debt as
of June 1994 accounted for about 71% of the total debt stock, compared with about 43%
in 1987.
Ajayi (1991) argues that the division of the factors into two seemingly water tight
compartments is quite misleading.  External factors do impinge crucially on domestic
factors — for example changes in terms of trade may influence the real effective exchange
rate. Hence the  major factors contributing to Uganda’s debt crisis can be summarized
as:
• of the world, price shocks in the 1970s. This was mainly reflected through increase
in import prices due to oil shocks.
 • Deterioration in the terms of trade and decline in export earnings particularly in the
1980s. There was a growth in arrears caused by the fall in coffee prices and this
greatly affected not only the foreign exchange earning capacity of the economy but
also the ability to sustain the servicing of debt obligations.
• Resulting from the above, interest on late payments built up to US$34.4 million at
end of June 1992; this is contributory factor in the increase of debt.
• The highly expansionary fiscal deficits
Having identified the internal and external factors influencing Uganda’s debt
accumulation, an empirical assessment is presented here using regression analysis to








=  the debt-export ratio
TOT =  terms of trade
CGDP =  growth rate of income in industrialized countries
FRRI =  foreign real interest rate
REER =  real effective exchange rate (developed in Appendix B)
FP =  fiscal performance (fiscal deficit)
T =  linear time trend
Table 9 shows the regression results. We find that a worsening of the terms of trade
significantly worsens the debt-export ratio.  An increase in the foreign interest rate would
tend to worsen this ratio just as an appreciation in the real effective exchange rate would.
From our equation estimations, however, the worsening of terms of trade appears to
have had the most significant impact given that much of Uganda’s experience over the
period of study was characterized by a decline in its terms of trade. Despite the insignificant
results for the fiscal performance variable, it is expected that a deterioration of the fiscal
position will also have a negative impact on the debt export ratio.  The linear time trend
variable is included to capture the likely influence of other external factors. The results
in Table 9 (excluding the time trend and constants) show that the most important variables
are the terms of trade and to a lesser extent the real effective exchange rate. This confirms
the fact that external factors have contributed significantly to Uganda’s debt situation.
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Table 9: Empirical results for the debt-export ratio


















Note: * Log values of all variables except CGDP.
The “t” values of the coefficients are in brackets below the relevant values.
** Significant at more than 5%.
VIII. Debt and economic growth
Since 1981, Uganda has pursued stabilization and structural adjustment policies in an
attempt to stimulate the recovery of the economy. These have attracted a substantial
amount of foreign resources in the form of loans, given that the required investment
level could not be met by domestic savings.  The reliance on foreign savings is justified
by the fact that gross domestic savings (GDS) expressed as a percentage of GDP was
negative for most of the sample period (1980—1995).  (See Table 10.)  The savings rate
is seen to lag behind the rate of investment (and this pattern is exhibited in both public
and private sectors).  From 1989, however, the savings-GDP ratio did improve, largely
because of high private unrequited transfers reflected in the current account of the balance
of payments.
An analysis of data on consumption and investment reveals that the economy absorbed
more than it produced and saved, which may have led to the suggestion that external
financing and accumulation of arrears sustained the Ugandan economy during the period
under review.
This gloomy situation is largely attributed to a narrow tax base, which shrank during
the years of economic decline, and inefficient financial intermediation resulting from
financial repression.  A substantial percentage of the budget deficit was monetized, which
resulted in accelerated inflation and a fall in the real deposit rate of interest in the formal
financial institution.  At the same time an increasing proportion of the declining supply
of real domestic credit was being expropriated by government to finance current
expenditures.  Consequently funds for both working and fixed capital investment, which
had mainly been financed by the banking system, were doubly squeezed.
The stock of external debt doubled, from US$1.29 billion in 1986 to US$2.65 billion
in 1993.  This is largely attributed to the implementation of the economic recovery
programme of rehabilitation investment and policy reforms that was adopted in 1987.
The continuous rise in debt was further aggravated by the accumulated effects of unpaid
debt service, interest costs and rescheduling. Economic liberalization and restructuring
have accompanied this programme, resulting in a 5% average real GDP growth rate,
with a 2% rise in per capita real incomes over the period 1987—1993.
The question then arises as to the sustainability of this economic growth and current
stock of debt.  In spite of more than ten years of implementing economic recovery and
SAP, the economy remains fragile, the export sector is struggling to recover and the
import capacity is largely sustained by the donor community.
A number of models have been constructed in an attempt to show the impact of capital
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imports on aggregate performance of sub-Saharan African economies.  The
Table 10: Selected national accounts data  (% of GDP)
Non Exports Imports Foreign Domestic Domestic Domestic Incremental
factor of goods of goods balance savings investment balance capital
services & nfs & nfs output  ratio
1970 24.62 21.10  -3.52  18.76 15.24   3.52   -
1971 20.75 24.90   4.15 12.45 16.60  -4.15 19.85
1972 20.77 17.80 -2.97 11.17   8.20   2.97   4.71
1973 17.19 13.75 -3.44 12.89   9.45   3.44 6.45
1974 17.37 17.37   0.00 13.42 13.42   0.00 -43.71
1975   8.68 11.09 2.41   5.78   8.19  -2.41  -5.46
1976 11.64  9.56  -2.08   8.32   6.24   2.08 10.30
1977   9.30  7.88  -1.41   7.48   6.06   1.41  3.14
1978 13.60 18.79   5.19   3.04   8.23  -5.19  -2.68
1979 19.35 17.49  -1.87   8.39   6.53   1.87  -0.50
1980 19.52 26.13   6.61  -0.40   6.21  -6.61  -1.35
1981 21.25 29.44   8.19  -0.74   7.45  -8.19   1.49
1982 21.51 33.25   7.73   1.43   9.17  -7.74   1.54
1983 18.97 24.65   5.68   4.26   9.94  -5.68   1.27
1984   9.75 30.95 21.20 -14.25   6.95 -21.20  -1.06
1985   9.60 30.40 20.80 -13.05   7.75 -20.80   3.90
1986   9.55 32.00 22.45 -12.50 10.00 -22.50 15.58
1987   8.40 35.20 26.80 -13.10 13.70 -26.80   2.04
1988   8.75 36.35 27.60 -14.85 12.70 -27.55   1.68
1989   9.15 32.35 23.20 -12.40 10.80 -23.20 1.48
1990   7.20 25.00 17.80  -5.75 12.00 -17.75 2.97
1991   6.90 21.50 14.60  -1.85 12.75 -14.60 3.08
1992   6.90 21.10 14.20   0.01 14.20 -14.19 2.04
1993   6.80 22.50 15.70  -1.10 14.55 -15.65 3.34
1994   7.05 22.00 14.95  -1.35 13.60 -14.95 3.20
1995   7.25 21.30 14.05  -1.05 13.00 -14.05 3.43
Source:World Bank (199O); Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Bank of Uganda.
majority of these models deal with labour surplus economies and emphasize growth of
capital stocks. The model used for analytical purpose in this paper emphasizes incremental
capital-output relationships, which suggest that the rate of economic growth increases if
the ratio of investment to national income rises and that an increase in capital imports
increases the investment ratio (see Cherney, 1966).
We use the two-gap theory of Cherney and Bruno (1962), which suggests that growth
is limited by two constraints. First, the savings gap constrains the country’s ability to
save and invest. Second, the foreign exchange gap accruing from limited export revenues
and the targeted growth rate of the economy causes imports to exceed the economy’s
ability to finance them. We also use the Harrod growth equation of the type
g = sk
where g is the real growth rate of national income, s is the ratio of savings to national
income and k is the incremental capital output ratio.
It is observed that gross savings in Uganda have been negative for most of the latter
part of the sample period and when gross domestic investment is taken into consideration,
the savings gap is seen to be extremely large. This has in most cases been accompanied
by positive real growth rates and suggests that growth has been driven by aid. Thus:
     g = (s + a)k
where a is the ratio of aid to national income. If g* is the targeted growth rate and k is
the assumed constant over time, the rate of capital accumulation necessary to achieve the
target growth rate is denoted by
         g* /k = s + a
let s+a = c and a = c-s.  Hence, c-s represents the savings gap.
 This analogy implies that aid inflows to Uganda should have the following potential
effects: (1) supplementing domestic savings, hence capital accumulation and (2) increasing
the proportion of income saved.
If this is the case then aid increases the capacity for economic growth and should
be able to lead the country to self-sustaining levels that subsequently reduce the amount
of aid contracted. The assumption is that the increase in aid is greater than the increase in
consumption.
On the foreign exchange gap, the assumption is that the value and volume of exports
is given as exogenous (X = X
o
 ), while the demand for imports largely depends on the
targeted rate of economic growth. Imports of capital goods depend on the level of
investment, and intermediate goods are a derived demand of capacity utilization rate.
Since domestic inputs are an imperfect substitute for imported intermediate goods, the
latter increase/decrease with an increase/decrease in production (Khan and Knight, 1988).
The cost of financing such imports in most cases has exceeded the earnings of foreign
exchange by exports.  A foreign exchange gap arises, which — if not closed by aid
resources — reduces the targeted economic growth.
Given that M = mY, where m is the marginal propensity to import and Y is national
income, the size of the foreign exchange gap is then denoted as mY - X
o
 and can be
denoted in terms of aid (a) as:
 a = m - (X
o
 /Y).
The implication of the foreign exchange gap is that the potential domestic savings are
being frustrated because the required capital goods necessary to undertake the desired
investment can neither be produced locally nor be acquired externally. Additional foreign
exchange when availed would raise the level of investment and subsequently the rate of
economic growth; this would imply that aid not only raises the level of investment but
also permits an increase in domestic savings.
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In the expost accounting sense, the two gaps are exactly equal, so that
                  a = c -s = m - (X
o
 / Y)
The domestic and foreign imbalances are shown in Table 6 and the changes in the
domestic balance each year have a strong bearing on the changes in the external balance.
By linking the internal and external imbalances, the sources of financing the domestic
balance are seen to be changes in the external balance. Available data seem to identify
the capital account of the balance of payments as the source of financing this overall
domestic imbalance, and this is made up of medium-and long-term loans. This appears
to justify the contraction of debt particularly during the period of stabilization and structural
adjustment of the Ugandan economy.
Debt viability: Growth cum debt model scenario
A growth cum debt model developed by Solis and Zedillo (1985) and used by Ajayi
(1991) is adopted in this paper for the analysis of debt sustainability.  The model focuses
on how debt affects the growth prospects of a debtor country.  (Details of the model are
in Appendix C.)
Using a growth dynamic equation denoted by
D
t
  =  D
t-1
 (1 + t)
where D
t
 is the total external debt and its growth rate (t)  is varied for values between
-0.03 and 0.07 and interest rates of 0.02, 0.04 and 0.07 are used.  These values are chosen
in accordance with the external debt strategy currently being implemented by the
government of Uganda.1
The incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) of 2.375 is the average for years 1987—
1995 the period under ERP2  (see Table 10) and s = 0.42 (the reciprocal of ICOR).
For different rates of interest and contraction of external debt, simulations were ran
for the period 1993—2000; the following indicators were used:
















(Dt − Dt −1) − (rtDt −1)
GDP
Table 11:  Simulation results of the growth cum debt model
(γ = 0.02; σ = 0.42)
g  DB1  DB2
0.07 0.0533 136.53 0.0638
0.06 0.0538 130.63 0.0493
0.05 0.0542 125.01 0.0357
0.04 0.0547 119.65 0.0230
0.03 0.0551 114.53 0.0111
0.02 0.0555 109.66 0.0000
0.01 0.0559 105.01 -0.0104
0.00 0.5562 100.57 -0.0201
-0.01 0.0666 96.33 -0.0292
-0.02 0.0570  92.29 -0.0377
-0.03 0.0573  88.44 -0.0456
(γ = 0.04 σ  = 0.42)
g  DB1  DB2
0.07 0.0377 145.78 0.0409
0.06 0.0387 139.14 0.0263
0.05 0.0398 132.84 0.0127
0.04 0.0407 126.86 0.0000
0.03 0.0416 121.19 -0.0180
0.02 0.0425 115.79 -0.0227
0.01 0.0434 110.67 -0.0329
0.00 0.0442 105.80 -0.0423
-0.01 0.0450 101.17 -0.0511
-0.02 0.0457  96.77 -0.0592
-0.03 0.0464  62.58 -0.0668
(γ = 0.07 σ  = 0.42)
g  DB1  DB2
0.07 0.0107 163.28 0.0000
0.06 0.0129 155.07 -0.0146
0.05 0.0150 147.36 -0.0281
0.04 0.0170 140.12 -0.0404
0.03 0.0189 133.30 -0.0510
0.02 0.0207 126.88 -0.0622
0.01 0.0207 120.83 -0.0718
0.00 0.0240 115.12 -0.0806
-0.01 0.0256 109.72 -0.0887
-0.02 0.0271 104.63 -0.0963
-0.03 0.0285  99.82 -0.1029
The results of these simulation are shown in Table 11. Specifically, the results reveal
that Uganda cannot at this time sustain debt that attracts interest rates of more than 7%
per annum with a growth of more than 2% per annum on average.  This permits a real
growth rate of only 2%; per annum considering a population growth rate of slightly more
than 2%, per annum there is a zero or negative growth in real per capita incomes.
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Accompanying it are debt-GDP ratios that are seen to be high for every rate of growth of
stock of debt and there is no positive resource transfer noted in this scenario. The scenario
with interest rates of 4% shows that a zero growth rate in stock of debt is consistent with
a 4.42% growth in GDP and a positive transfer of resources is only possible at a rate of
growth of debt above 4% per annum.
The simulation also shows that low interest rates, e.g., 2%, attract higher rates of
economic growth as greater resource transfer is permitted for every level of t; this is
consistent with low DB
1
 and high DB
2
.
The simulation results are compared with the balance of payments (BOP) projections
for the fiscal years 1993/94—2002/03 as provided by the Ugandan authorities. The
projections assume that all interest and amortization falling due are fully externalized
just as the model used here assumes.  The projected average annual growth rate of external
debt up to the fiscal year 2000/01 is 3.44% with a computed average interest rate of
1.64% per annum.  Table 12 gives the Ugandan authorities' projections and these are
compared with those simulated by the model used in this paper.
Table 12: Comparison of Uganda authorities’ projections with simulated variables
generated by the model




DB2 (as percentage) 2.1 2.0
The higher growth rate of 6.27% per annum simulated by the model is based on the
assumption that all foreign resources are fully used for investment.  This is one major
problem about the two-gap model because it assumes that all foreign capital is used to
complement domestic savings, thereby raising investment and economic growth.  Some
of the foreign capital is used to finance consumption (Griffin, 1970), however, and capital
inflows may affect relative prices by changing the sectoral balances of the economy
(through changes in production patterns) hence income distribution and the domestic
savings function.  The Ugandan authorities' projections appear to have given allowance
for current consumption because some of the foreign resources are actually used for
budgetary support that ends up for current consumption.
Both scenarios (see Table 12) show that there will be a net transfer of resources to
Uganda from the donor community averaging 2% of GDP annually for the period 1993—
2000.  This is largely on the grounds that the rate of loan contraction is projected to be
higher than the computed interest rate for this sample period. A simulation of economic
growth rates, debt-GDP and resource transfer ratios is carried out for the period 1993—
2000; this involves changing the domestic savings and incremental capital output ratios
used to generate the variables in Table 12.  The numbers simulated for the different
macroeconomic variables are then compared with their base value, i.e., zero growth
rates in savings ratio and an ICOR of 2.375.
The results specifically reveal that policies designed to increase the efficiency of
capital, i.e., lower the ICORs for any given level of domestic savings ratios, do generally
raise the economic growth rates, and lower the debt and resource transfer ratios expressed
as a percentage of GDP.  Similarly, any increase in the domestic savings ratio for any
given level of ICOR has the same effect as noted above.
It is then suggested that government pursue policies that will increase the capacity
utilization of existing capital stock and the aggregate domestic savings ratios.  These
policies are analysed in the latter part of this paper.
A major problem of aid extended to Uganda is noted in its fungibility.  Even the
World Bank,3  which used to take pride in the soundness and high rate of economic
return of its projects, has of late funded projects that could be ranked very low on the list
of economic priorities and even now World Bank financing is not necessarily geared to
the most attractive projects. Bilateral aid has also tended to promote fungibility because
of the “sourcing” conditions attached to these lines of credit — requiring, for example,
that a good proportion of the raw materials and technical assistance has to originate from
the donor country.
Another impact of aid on Uganda’s investment pattern is the extent to which it has
stimulated the consumption of importables.  To date, nearly 30% of the tax revenue is
generated from external trade sources of which a good proportion is financed by the
donor community.  Efforts to stimulate domestic savings through tax incentives have
proved unsuitable for mobilizing domestically generated resources.  It would then appear
that Uganda can only continue recording positive growth rates with the funding of the
donor community, a situation that is nationally very discouraging.
An analysis of the type of investment funded by the donor community reveals that
nearly 60% of it is allocated to social overhead capital and economic infrastructure.4
Directly productive activities such as factory construction have only succeeded in
attracting a relatively small proportion of total aid.  True as it is said that infrastructure
deserves priority, the general bias against directly productive activities has tended to
lower the aggregate-output of the economy.  This point is important in relation to debt-
servicing, which is at crisis proportion in the country. The gestation period of these projects
is seen to exceed the grace period and consequently, debt servicing has become a problem.
To date, the government borrows from bilateral sources in order to make payments to
multilateral creditors like the World Bank who have financed such projects. Private
investment, on the other hand, is relatively low and cannot on its own be relied on to
make optimum use of the massive investment in overhead capital and economic
infrastructure.
The relationship between the investment and economic growth rates shows that the
latter in relation to the former is low.  Ndulu (1991) suggests that in a situation where
capacity underutilization obtains, a high investment growth rate could result in a low
real economic growth rate; that is:
g = g
p
  +  g
u
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where  g
p
 is the sum of capacity growth driven by investment
g
u
 is the rate of capacity utilization
g is the actual economic growth rate
From this definition it is possible to observe that high investment (g
p
) rates can co-
exist with declining or relatively low actual economic growth rates as long as capacity is
underutilized.  It is noted that the statistics from the index of industrial production show
an average of less than 50% utilization of Uganda’s installed capacity.
It could then be argued that the process of growth should not only influence the capacity
growth but also the rate of capacity utilization.  One way to enhance growth is to emphasize
resource allocation between capacity expansion and utilization given that savings —
and hence investment — ultimately depend on actual income growth.
An analysis of the components of investment reveals that foreign savings have
contributed the largest proportion to it.  Its elasticity with respect to output is much
higher when compared with domestic savings elasticity.  This is largely on the grounds
that domestic resource mobilization is inelastic to policies designed to mobilize it; external
capital may then be a key force propelling any growth accruing from investment.
The Cohen model
The main issue addressed by the Cohen model is the trade deficit that is feasible if the D/
X5  is to be kept from rising — i.e., what trade deficit (b) gives us D/Xo = 0 (see Appendix
A for details of the model).
Table 13 gives the values for b, D/X; the 1982 D/X ratio is chosen as a starting point
and D/Xo is then kept constant. As an example, it would have required the economy to
have run a trade deficit of US$29.13 million on its current account instead of the recorded
surplus of US$114 million in 1985 if D/X was to be kept constant. Further, b* compares
with b in that b* is the computed trade deficit that should have been run given (1) D/X,
(2) rate of growth of exports and (3) the interest rate on the stock of DOD; b is the actual
trade deficit recorded (or expected to be recorded for the period 1993—2000).
Table 13 suggests the trade deficits recorded for the years 1983, 1984, 1987, 1988,
1990, 1990, 1991 and 1992 are not consistent with the stock of debt and this therefore
required the economy to have run a surplus on its trade account through either exporting
more or cutting down on imports, if the D/X was to be held constant. The rest of the
years in the sample period 1980—2000 suggest that a trade deficit could be run on the
current account not because of the good performance in the export sector but rather on
grounds that the computed rate of interest on the stock of DOD happens to be lower than
the growth in exports. The years 1993 to 2000 permit the running of a trade deficit on the
current account largely because the implementation of the external debt strategy calls for
contraction of highly concessionary loans, reduced stock of DOD through restructuring
of debt and reduced growth in the stock of debt.
Table 13: Uganda data for the Cohen model
Year  D  r  r*  x  dx  m d/x  b  b*
1981  793.9 13.2 345 293 -52 30.01
1982  933.4 26.3 0.03 396.86   15.03 379.69 2  -17.17  -18.75
1983 1016.4 41 0.04 367.7   -7.35 421.1  2.54 60.4  -20.78
1984 1031.1 65 0.06 342.2   -6.94 407.9  2.97 65.7 29.13
1985 1171.3 53 0.05 379  10.75 264.1  2.72 -114.9 21.02
1986 1286.6 43 0.03 406.8 7.34 438.2  2.88 31.4  -69.48
1987 1659 36 0.02 333.6 -17.95 591.3  3.86  264.7 -125.8
1988 1799 35 0.02 266.3 -20.17 658.2  6.23  391.9 27.57
1989 1809 46 0.03 277.7 4.28 710 6.48  462.3 -366.2
1990 2200 47.8 0.02 177.8 -35.97 617.6 10.17  439.8  -28.88
1991 2300 73.8 0.03 173.8   -2.25 474.4 12.66  300.6 -208.5
1992 2592 97.8 0.04 150.2 -13.58 512 15.31  361.8  236.6
1993 2652 53.1 0.02 174.1  15.91 591.5 14.89  417.4  300.75
1994 2783.1 52.8 0.02 218.4  25.45 629.3 12.14  410.9  199.73
1995 2880.8 51.8 0.02 250.05  18.61 666.4 10.74  487.35  121.76
1996 2969.9 51 0.02 290.95  12.31 707.3  9.9  416.35 85.06
1997 3053 49.6 0.02 317.45 9.11 755.9  9.36  438.45 75.31
1998 3143.5 47.4 0.02 344.5 8.52 808.4  8.86  463.9 71.41
1999 3252.7 44.3 0.01 373.8 8.51 864 8.41  490.2 68.13
2000 3395.8 40.7 0.01 405.6 8.51 925.1  8.02  519.5
Source: World Bank (1990); Ministry of Finance, Uganda; Bank of Uganda; own analysis.
Definition of variables
D = debt stock
r = interest rate
r* = computed interest rate
x = exports
d/x = debt export ratio
b = trade deficit (recorded and projected)
b* = computed trade deficit
m = imports
dx = growth of exports
The Cohen and growth cum debt models can be compared for the period 1993—
2000.  With the Cohen model, the interest rate computed from Table 13 lies between 1%
and 2% (average 1.75% for the sample period) with an average annual growth rate in the
DOD of 3.44%; per annum, which permits a net resource transfer as reflected by b*.  The
growth cum debt model that uses interest rates of 1.64% and a growth in stock of DOD
of 3.44% also suggests a positive net inflow of resources averaging 2% of GDP annually.
The two models therefore seem to suggest that net resource inflows are possible at least
up to the year 2000 largely because of the grounds of the external debt policy pursued by
the government.
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IX.  Summary and policy implications
This paper analyses the external debt burden of a severely indebted low income country
and raises the crucial issue of growth and debt sustainability. As at end June 1993, Uganda’s
total debt stock was estimated at US$2.64 billion, with a debt service ratio of over 80%.
Uganda’s external debt from the 1970s has remained predominantly multilateral debt,
with institutions such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the IMF
representing over 70 % of the total debt stock. Uganda’s debt-export ratio also remains
high — over 1000%. The fact that much of the debt accumulated is from multilateral
creditors limits Uganda’s flexibility in reducing its debt service burden through traditional
reschedulings.
Uganda’s accumulation of external debt is due to both domestic and external influences.
The external causes include the shift in terms of trade and resulting decline in coffee
export earnings. The domestic causes include poor macroeconomic policies arising from
fiscal indiscipline, exchange rate misalignment, overall economic mismanagement and
poor debt management.
The multilateral debt problem is one that has to be tackled specifically if Uganda is to
experience any meaningful debt relief. The international financial institutions’ main
strategy for dealing with the huge debt claims has been concessional lending. Indeed, the
international community has been generous in providing debt relief to Uganda, reflecting
its adjustment record and its status as an SILIC. The burden of its debt to multilateral
creditors remains extremely heavy, however, and it is in view of this that a multilateral
debt fund is to be set up specifically to address multilateral debt relief.
The accumulation of arrears is a serious problem.   The successful implementation of
the debt strategy depends on negotiating reschedulings in all categories of debt, on the
achievement of a number of cancellations and the availability of funds to institute buy-
backs. Uganda is also receiving considerable concessional debt relief.
Debt relief is only part of the answer. Continued government commitment to structural
reforms and sound debt management are essential. The Ugandan government is currently
implementing adjustment policies with the prime objective of restoring investment and
economic growth. Increased domestic savings financed by resource mobilization through
appropriate monetary policies could also raise the estimated growth rate, without any
increase in external aid inflows.
The two models used in this paper (The growth cum debt model and the Cohen model)
show that Uganda is in a position to run a trade deficit between 1993 and 2000 of up to
6% of GDP on its current account while maintaining a constant debt-export ratio. This
can be largely attributed to a debt strategy that has greatly reduced the interest rate of
loans contracted and further decreased the overall size of the debt through restructuring
and debt reduction techniques.
The target growth rate of 5% per annum as estimated by the Ugandan authorities
could be raised to 6.27% per annum for the period 1993-2000. This is only possible if the
resources devoted to current consumption funded by aid are reduced. Any policy that
limits the estimated current consumption to domestically generated revenue while devoting
external finance to investment could enable achievement of higher economic growth.
Finally, Uganda has already made significant progress as a result of rescheduling
agreements and more favourable lending terms over and above recent improvements in
export prices, hence resulting in a declining trend of its debt-export ratio. The overall
increase in capital inflows has improved the prospects for less reliance on exceptional
financing in the form of net accumulation of arrears, rescheduling and gross use of IMF
resources. The sustainability of a favourable balance of payments without exceptional
financing very much depends on domestic performance. For growth to be sustained,
strong and persistent adjustment efforts by the government must be continuously
maintained. These efforts should particularly address the productive base and reduce
structural bottlenecks in the economy, while at the same time adapting appropriate
macroeconomic policy to avoid the re-emergence of uncontrollable inflation rates and
encourage the flexibility in the clearing of financial markets.
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Notes
1.    The debt strategy calls for contraction of highly concessionary loans and maximum
possible reduction in the stock of debt.  The rates of interest and growth of debt stock
chosen for this analysis are therefore in line with the government debt strategy.
2.  The methodology used in computing ICOR in this paper is derived from the Central
Bank of Ecuador in Financing Economic Development by Fitzgerald and Vos (1989).
The impact of a foreign exchange boom (derived from exports) accompanied by
average or lower growth rates of GDP is a high ICOR, and for Uganda, the years
1976 and 1986 typify this.  The ICOR, is of course undermined or less meaningful
when the economy is in a downswing with zero or negative growth rate.
3. The World Bank is the single largest source of credit to Uganda.  In 1992, it accounted
for 60.76% and 41.04% of the total DOD from multilateral and all sources,
respectively.
4. This includes transport facilities, electric energy, education, health and road
construction.
5. D/X  is the debt stock-export ratio, where the debt stock is of the preceding year and
exports are for the current year.
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     =     debt-export ratio or the debt-GNP ratio
TOT = terms of trade
CGDP = growth rate of income in industrialized countries
FRRI = foreign real interest rate
REER = real effective exchange rate index (developed in Appendix B)
FPY = fiscal performance (fiscal deficit/GDP) or fiscal deficit
T = linear time trend
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Appendix B: Real effective exchange rate
There are many methods of deriving the real effective exchange rate.  One of the derivation
methods uses trade weights.












= trade weight of Uganda’s ith trading partner
e
i
= Nominal exchange rate between Ugandan shillings and the
respective currencies of the major trading partners
P
i
= Consumer price index (CPI) of trading partner country i
P
d
= Ugandan domestic CPI
Appendix  C: Debt viability model
Model used for the debt viability: Growth cum debt model scenario in text (Solis and
Zedillo, 1985).
The level of output is given by
Y =  σK (1)
Define
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Appendix D:  The Cohen model
The stock of debt at the end of previous year is given by
(D/Xo) = d(D/X)/d (1)
(D/X’) = (D/Xo)/(D/X) (2)
Equation 2 becomes
(D/Xo) = (D/X’) * (D/X)
 = (D/X’)d:     Where d = D/X
Given that,
(D/X’) = (D’ - X’)
(D/Xo) = (D’ - x’)d
 = D1d - X1d (3)
Where x = growth of exports
(D/Xo) = (Do/D)d - xd  3'
If  r = world real interest rate, and B = trade deficit
(R-X)d+B
(D/Xo) = (Do/D)d - xd
If Do/D   = (rD+B)/D
= r+(B/D)
Then
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(D/Xo) = (r - x)d + (B/D) * (D/X) (4)
(D/Xo) = (r - x)d + B/X
Let B/X = b
Equation 4 becomes
(r - x)d + b
For (D/Xo) = 0
b = (r - x)d (5)
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